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In Haley v. Troy,41 a district court, in holding that judicial immunity does
not extend to cases where equitable relief is sought, recognized the vacuum
of controlling case law in the area. 42 However, the court speculated that the
Supreme Court would soon be faced with a similar case and would rule in a
manner favorable to its decision in Haley. The court in so speculating
stated:
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly in a case where
equitable relief against a judicial officer was the object, it has in at
least one case issued a temporary restraining order against a state court
judge, and on final hearing
reversed a district court's refusal to grant a
48
permanent injunction.
It is highly probable that Little v. Berbling may be the case in which the Supreme Court speaks directly in this area of law, and determines that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not extend into those situations where
equitable relief is sought.
Adrian Gregory Acevedo

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-TEXAS
-THE

TORT CLAIMS ACT-FEDERAL COURTS
TEXAS LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

IN SUITS AGAINST THE STATE OF TEXAS UNDER THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS

ACT IN FEDERAL As WELL As IN STATE COURTS. Flores v. Norton &
Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
The plaintiff was proceeding north in his tractor-trailer truck on Interstate 35 near New Braunfels, Texas when he was directed to stop for a vehicle weight and license check by a patrolman of the Texas Department of
Public Safety. As the plaintiff descended from the cab of his truck, defendant's truck, also traveling in a northerly direction, struck the rear of the
plaintiff's vehicle. The driver of the defendant's truck was killed, the plaintiff injured, and both vehicles severely damaged. The plaintiff filed suit in
federal district court against the defendant, Norton & Ramsey Lines. The
defendant, in turn, filed a third party complaint against the Texas Department of Public Safety under Section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act' for inRockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. Va. 1970); Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Ginsburg v.
Stem, 125 F. Supp. 596, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
41. 338 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1972).
42. Id. at 800-01.
43. Id. at 800. The case referred to in the statement in which the Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order was Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 89
S. Ct. 1101, 22 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1969).
1. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970).
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demnity or contribution in the event he was found negligent in the primary
suit.
The Department of Public Safety, represented by the attorney general,
filed a motion to dismiss. The attorney general contended that the State's
waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 4 of the Texas Tort Claims Act did
not apply to suits brought in federal courts, and that the negligent acts of a
highway patrolman, even if determined to be the proximate cause of the

plaintiff's injuries, did not create state liability under section 3 of the Act.
Held: Motion denied. Under provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Texas
Tort Claims Act, the State waived its right of sovereign immunity in federal
as well as state courts, and may be held liable for the negligent act of a highway patrolman committed within the scope of his employment.
It has long been recognized that total sovereign immunity from tort claims
2
is an unnecessarily harsh and arbitrary doctrine that must be modified.
Judicial assaults upon the doctrine have failed to provide a substantial degree
of relief for a number of reasons, 3 the principal one being the lack of consistency among jurisdictions. 4 Legislative action has proven to be a much
more effective means of relieving the inequities of sovereign immunity without discarding the doctrine altogether. 5 Legislative enactments have also
had their problems," one of the most fundamental being the jurisdictional
2. Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TExks L. REv. 462, 472

(1971).
3. See Note, Limitations on the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from
Suit, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (1941), for a general survey of various judicial limitations.
4. Meska v. City of Dallas, 429 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ
ref'd) (the court refused to waive governmental immunity); accord, Clarke v. RuidosoHondo Valley Hosp., 380 P.2d 168 (N.M. 1963). But see Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced guidelines
that in essence abolished governmental immunity); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959) (Illinois Supreme Court abrogated governmental immunity for school districts on a broad scale). In Parish v. Pitts, 429
S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968), the Arkansas Supreme Court abolished municipal governmental immunity only to have it revived by the legislature during their next session.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971).
5. At least 12 states have adopted tort claims statutes waiving sovereign immunity to some degree within the last 10 years: ALAs. STAT. § 09.65.070 (Supp. 1972);
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7465 (1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-101 to -103 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN.
§. 613.A1-.All (Supp. 1973); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996 (101-115) (1962); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 466.02 (1963); NEV. ReV. STAT. §§ 41.031-.038 (1965); TEX. REV. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1968); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.43
(1966).
6. The Texas Legislature statutorily removed the requirement of sovereign consent to negligence suits brought against the state. TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 962
(1963) (municipalities); TrX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1573 (1962) (counties).
However, the Texas courts held that such action did not apply the doctrine of
respondeat superior to governmental enterprises. City of Tyler v. Ingram, 139 Tex.
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scope of the state's liability. There is no question that a state may elect
to waive sovereign immunity and limit the waiver to designated tribunals
created exclusively for that purpose, 7 or that it may waive sovereign immunity in the state's own courts while specifically retaining it in federal jurisdictions. 8 It is also recognized that the waiver of sovereign immunity does
not automatically authorize suits against the state in federal courts. 9 The
problems primarily arise when the legislatures fail to provide their newly created "waivers" with specific jurisdictional limits, and the courts are called
upon to "second guess" the legislatures' intentions.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of statutory consent holding that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.1 0 Justice Douglas appropriately summarized this approach when he
said, "The conclusion that there has been a waiver of [sovereign] immunity
will not be lightly inferred."" Today, the predominance of judicial authority follows the Douglas maxim and holds that unless there is a specific provision to the contrary, the language of a waiver statute is construed to exclude
all actions in federal courts. 12 In Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v.
600, 605, 164 S.W.2d 516, 519 (1942); see Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
7. See Tnx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
8. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445, 20 S. Ct. 919, 922, 44 L. Ed. 1140, 1145
(1900); Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of Hwys., 319 F. Supp. 948, 950 (E.D.
La. 1970).
9. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S. Ct. 873, 877, 88 L.
Ed. 1121, 1126 (1944); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 168, 29 S. Ct.
458, 463, 53 L. Ed. 742, 750 (1909); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591, 24 S. Ct. 766,
766, 48 L. Ed. 1129, 1131 (1904); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445, 20 S. Ct. 919,
922, 44 L. Ed. 1140, 1145 (1900).
10. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579, 66 S.
Ct. 745, 748, 90 L. Ed. 862, 867 (1946) (state statute providing for action in "any
court of competent jurisdiction" held no consent to federal suit); Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 468, 65 S. Ct. 347, 352, 89 L. Ed. 389, 396
(1944) (Indiana statute authorizing suit in "the circuit or superior court of the
county in which the taxpayer resides or is located" held no consent to federal suit);
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S.Ct. 873, 876, 88 L. Ed. 1121,
1126 (1944) (state statute authorizing recovery of taxes in "the court having jurisdiction thereof" held no consent to federal suit); Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Government
of the United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1924) (the court affirmed the
state's right to retract its waiver of sovereign immunity after a suit has been filed in a
federal court). But see Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 392,
14 S.Ct. 1047, 1052, 38 L. Ed. 1014, 1021 (1894) (court held that even though the
language of a statute called for suits to be filed "in a court of competent jurisdiction in
Travis County, Texas," this did not preclude suits from being brought in the federal
district court in Travis County).
11. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276, 79 S.Ct. 785,
787, 3 L. Ed. 2d 804, 807 (1959); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct.
1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).
12. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579, 66 S.Ct.
745, 748, 90 L. Ed. 862, 867 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323
U.S. 459, 468, 65 S.Ct. 347, 352, 89 L. Ed. 389, 396 (1944); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S. Ct. 873, 876, 88 L. Ed. 1121, 1126 (1944); Murray v.
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Guernsey,13 the plaintiff brought a bill of equity in federal court against
Guernsey and the State of Washington as codefendants, seeking the balance
due on a construction contract. The state attorney general voluntarily entered
the suit and filed an answer. The court determined that the statutory provision
authorizing suits against the state filed "in the Superior Court of Thurston
County"' 4 was construed to be a consent to be sued only in a state court.
The court went on to say that the attorney general's voluntary entry had no
effect upon the jurisdictional question since "immunity of the state

. . .

can

only be waived by the Legislature, and [the state] is in no manner bound or
estopped by the acts of its officers."' 15 Today, a majority of courts still favor
strict construction of waiver statutes; however, there appears to be a significant movement away from that position.' 6
Recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court is departing from its own
strict construction doctrine and is softening its position concerning the interpretation of waiver statutes.' 7 In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,' 8 the Supreme Court held that where a bistate corporation's compact
authorized it to sue and be sued, this waiver of tort immunity was applicable
in both state and federal courts.' 9 Even more recently, the Court held that
a statute stating that the jurisdiction of federal courts "shall be concurrent
with that of the courts of several States,' '20 was not intended to limit federal
jurisdiction, but merely to provide an alternate forum in state courts. 2 ' Although the Supreme Court's departure from the doctrine of strict construction has been slight, it appears to have had a pronounced effect on the lower
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S. Ct. 458, 464, 53 L. Ed. 742, 751
(1909); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591, 24 S. Ct. 766, 766, 48 L. Ed. 1129, 1131

(1904); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 448, 20 S. Ct. 919, 924, 44 L. Ed. 1140, 1146
(1900).
13. 205 F. 94 (W.D. Wash. 1913). See also Annot., 88 L. Ed. 1132, 1134 (1943).
14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.010 (Supp. 1972).
15. Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Guernsey, 205 F. 94, 95 (W.D. Wash. 1913). The
two primary methods of waiving sovereign immunity are: (1) Consenting to be sued
by express provision in a statute; and (2) waiver of immunity to suit by voluntary
appearance. Annot., 88 L. Ed. 1132 (1943).
16. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 197-98, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 1216,
12 L. Ed. 2d 233, 243 (1964); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718
(4th Cir. 1961); Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); McCorkle
v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 (1969). See generally Greenhill &
Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 462 (1971); Cullison, Interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. Rav. 1 (1967).
17. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 197-98, 84 S. CT. 1207, 1216,
12 L. Ed. 2d 233, 243 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S.
275, 280, 79 S. Ct. 785, 789, 3 L. Ed. 2d 804, 809 (1959). See generally Greenhill &
Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TExAs L. REV. 462 (1971); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1967).

18. 359 U.S. 275, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1959).
19. Id. at 281-82, 79 S. Ct. at 789, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 809-10 (emphasis added).

20. Federal Employee's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
21. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 1212, 12 L. Ed. 2d
233, 239 (1964).
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courts. Within the last decade there has been a significant increase in the
number of both state and federal courts construing ambiguous statutory waivers of sovereign immunity liberally in favor of injured claimants. 22 This
general trend has progressed to a point where some state supreme courts have
abrogated governmental immunity for torts altogether. 23 Justice Frankfurter
perhaps summarized the motivation behind those courts adopting the liberal
approach to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read,24 when he stated:
Whether . . . [governmental] immunity is an absolute survival of the
monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on
abstract logical grounds . . . it undoubtedly runs counter
2 5 to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.
Most state legislation aimed at limiting governmental immunity has been
judicially prompted. 2 6 Texas, however, was one of two states27 which acted
to liberalize the doctrine of sovereign immunity of its own volition. 28 In
1969, after having rejected several similar bills, the Texas Legislature passed
the Texas Tort Claims Act. 29 The purposes behind the Act's creation was
to provide relief for injured persons by applying the doctrine of respondeat
superior to governmental enterprises just as it applies to private enterprise
under common law.30 The Act expressly waived sovereign immunity for all
22. Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). The court ruled
that "where immunity from suit in federal courts is granted but immunity from suit in
the State courts is completely waived, the limitation upon the waiver is ineffective."
See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 (4th Cir. 1961); Kelso v.
City of Tacoma, 390 P.2d 2, 5 (Wash. 1964).
23. Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scheele v.
City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582, 584 (Alas. 1963); Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45,
53 (Ark. 1968); Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 264 A.2d 34,
37 (N.J. 1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Wis. 1962).
24. 322 U.S. 47, 64 S. Ct. 873, 88 L. Ed. 1121 (1944).
25. Id. at 59, 64 S. Ct. at 879, 88 L. Ed. at 1126 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
26. Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TExAs L. REv. 462, 467
(1971).
27. Utah was the only other state to place statutory limits on governmental immunity without prior judicial prompting. Id. at 467.
28. Id. at 467. Justice Greenhill noted that the legislature was possibly influenced
by the dicta in a charitable immunity case, in which the court reflected a willingness
to review governmental immunity. Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d
539 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
29. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970). Fearing the original bill was
"too broad and all encompassing in scope as to impose upon the taxpayers of the State
of Texas an onerous burden," Governor Smith vetoed it. Message from Governor
Smith, TEx. H.R.J. 1621, quoted in Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49
TEXAS L. REV. 462, 467 (1971).
30. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970). There is a general
reservation of immunity at the planning and policy making levels of government and
also in the area of legislative and judicial action. A pure doctrine of respondeat
superior cannot be applied to governmental functions that require immunity from judicial evaluation. See Keeton, Summary Statement-Texas Tort Claims Act, attached
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governmental units and granted injured claimants the right to sue to the extent of the waiver.31 To better effect its purposes and define the scope of its
jurisdiction, the legislature provided that the Act "shall be liberally construed .... -32 This provision fell on deaf ears. In Weaver v. Hirsty,33

a plaintiff filed suit in federal district court for injuries arising out of an automobile accident, and the defendant impleaded the Texas Highway Commission. The defendant alleged that the commission, through its employees,
negligently surfaced the highway where the accident occurred and that this
was the proximate cause of the collision. The defendant sought to implead
the commission for indemnity and contribution in the event she was found

negligent in the main cause. The State argued that the Texas Tort Claims
Act did not waive its sovereign immunity in federal courts under the eleventh amendment. The court dismissed the third party complaint on the
grounds that the venue provision in section 5 required suits to be initiated in
the county where the cause of action occurred, 3 4 and this necessarily limited
suits to the state courts. In those counties which seat both state and federal

courts, section 7 precludes suits in the federal jurisdiction by requiring all

actions to be governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Together,
these sections contemplated waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts
only.3 6 As the case of first impression, the court in Weaver applied the traditional strict construction doctrine to the newly created Texas Tort Claims
37
Act.
Less than 2 weeks after the Weaver decision, the court in Flores v. Norton
& Ramsey Lines, Inc.,38 was faced with the same preliminary jurisdictional
issue that faced the Weaver court: To what degree has the Texas Tort

Claims Act waived sovereign immunity?

In accurately interpretating the

SENATE INTERIM COMM., 62d Legislature of
SENATE ON THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT A-15, A-16 (1971).
31. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 4 (1970).

as exhibit "C" to

Texas,

REPORT TO THE

"To the extent of such
liability created by section 3, immunity of the sovereign to suit, as heretofore recognized and practiced in the State of Texas with reference to units of government, is
hereby expressly waived and abolished, and permission is hereby granted by the Legislature to all claimants to bring suit against the State of Texas, or any and all other
units of government covered by this Act, for all claims arising hereunder."
32. Id. § 13.
33. No. 5513 (E.D.Tex., Nov. 22, 1972) (not yet reported).
34. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 5 (1970). "All cases arising under
the provisions of this Act shall be instituted in the county in which the cause of action
. . .arises."
35. Id. § 7. "The laws and statutes of the State of Texas and the Rules of Civil
Procedure

.

.

. insofar as applicable . . . shall apply to and govern all actions

brought under the provision of this Act."
36. Weaver v. Hirsty, No. 5513, at 3 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 1972).
37. The court made no mention of section 13 which states: "This Act shall be
liberally construed to achieve the purposes hereof." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-19, § 13 (1970).
38. 352 F.Supp. 150 (W.D.Tex. 1972).
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scope of the Act, the Flores court applied a generally recognized test for the
existence of eleventh amendment immunity: (1) Has the state consented
to be sued in federal courts, and if so, (2) is there a cause of action against
39
the state?
Although unable to distinguish the case from Weaver on the facts, the
court declined to apply the doctrine of strict construction to the issue of
whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waived sovereign immunity in federal
courts. 40 The court declared that the language of section 441 of the Act expressly grants permission to all claimants to sue the state, and that had the
legislature specifically intended to retain sovereign immunity in all cases filed
in federal courts, it would have stated so in sections 4 or 14, where other
numerous exceptions to the liability are set out. 42 The court next criticized
the conclusion of the Weaver court that the venue provision in section 5 limited suits to state courts only, since state statutes prescribing venue have not
generally been held to preclude suits in federal courts. 43 The court also
held that the reference to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in section 7
was only "insofar as applicable,' '44 and not intended to restrict the scope of
the Act to exclude federal jurisdictions. Obviously the Texas rules were
not applicable in federal courts. 45 Acordingly, the court concluded that the
waiver of sovereign immunity in suits against the State under the Texas Tort
Claims Act was effective in both federal
and state courts, and subsequently
46
case.
the
over
jurisdiction
had
the court
Having determined that the State had statutorily consented to be sued in
a federal jurisdiction, the second issue facing the court was whether there
existed a cause of action against the State. Do the actions of the highway
patrolman, if proven to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, create liability to the State under the Texas Tort Claims Act?47 Absent precedent, the State's allegations rested on the interpretation of section 3 of the Act
39. Aero-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 1971); see Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 462, 65 S. Ct. 347, 349, 89 L. Ed. 389, 393
(1944).
40. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D. Tex.
1972).
41. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 4 (1970). "To the extent of such
liability created by section 3 . .. is hereby expressly waived . . .and permission is
hereby granted ... to bring suit against the State of Texas ...."
42. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D. Tex.
1972) (court's emphasis).
43. Id.; see Ellis v. Associated Indus. Ins. Corp., 24 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 649 (1928); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
44. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 7 (1970) (court's emphasis);
see Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
45. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D. Tex.
1972).

46. Id. at 154.
47. Id. at 154.
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as referring to premises defects only. 4s With this interpretation, and the
exclusions in section 18(b), 49 the State contended it owed the plaintiff only
the duty a private person owes a licensee on private property, that is, not

to injure him willfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence.

0

51

Thus the

The court
State would only be liable if the officer was personally liable.
first attacked the logic behind the State's argument by assuming it to be correct and then attempting to reconcile the assumption with the second sentence
in section 18(b) which states, "the limitation of duty contained in this subsection shall not apply to . . . obstructions on highways, roads, or streets
-52 The court found the State's interpretation was clearly erroneous
....
and declared that the legislature did not intend to apply the limited licensee
rationale to the use of state highways.5 3 The court, however, was not satisfied with the State's primary assumption that the language of section 3 was
concerned with premises defects only and rebutted this argument by quoting
from Justice Greenhill: "The result [of the passage of the Act] is essentially
waiver [of sovereign immunity] in three general areas: use of publicly
owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions
or use of property. ' ' 4 The court further stated that since public roadways
are "subject to the use" of highway patrolmen, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that tangible property of the State was being "used" by a proper
custodian, 53 and thus it is irrelevant whether the patrolman was independently liable in the main cause or not. 56 The court found that there was suf48. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970). "Each unit . . . shall be
liable ... for personal injuries. . . caused from some condition or ... use of tangible
property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit of government, if a
"
private person would be liable to the claimant ..
49. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (1970). "As to premises
defects, the unit of government shall owe to any claimant only the duty owed by private persons to a licensee on private property . . . . [This limitation] shall not
apply to the duty to warn of . . . obstructions on highways, roads, or streets ....
50. Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
51. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Tex.
1972); see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970).
52. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
See also SENATE INTERiM COMM., 62d Legislature of Texas, REPORT TO THE SENATE
ON THE TExAs TORT CLAIMS ACT 3 (1971). "Premises problems have been of only
slight concern to date, in view of the express provision [of section 18(b)] added after
the gubernatorial veto classifying all persons using governmental premises as 'licensees'
except as to roadway defects and obstructions." [Emphasis added.]
53. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Tex.
1972).
54. Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TExAs L. REv. 462, 468
(1971) (emphasis added).
55. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Texi
1972).
56. Even where the liability of the state is directly contingent upon the individual
liability of an employee, the California Supreme Court held the City of Los Angeles
liable under the California Tort Claims Act as a result of the.negligence of one of its
patrolmen who, while investigating an accident, asked the plaintiff to step into the

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss1/11
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ficient cause to join the State as a third party and hold57 it vicariously liable
for the negligence of its employees should any be proven.
The court summed up its position by citing section 13 of the Act: "[T]his
Act shall be liberally construed to achieve the purposes hereof." 58 In recognizing that section 13 was the key to proper interpretation, the court refused to confine itself to the arbitrary jurisdictional restrictions advocated by
the Weaver court; or to sustain a motion to dismiss based on the State's
clearly erroneous interpretations. Applying section 13 to the general
issue of whether the waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is also a
waiver in federal jurisdictions, the Flores decision is the only logical interpretation. The limits of recovery are specific; theoretically the plaintiff's
cause of action is neither advanced nor prejudiced by bringing suit in a federal court. It is also difficult to imagine that holding a state vicariously
liable for the negligence of its highway patrolmen was not within the legislature's intentions when they drafted the Act.
The Texas Tort Claims Act is still in the embryo of its development; its
future as viable relief from the harsh inequities of total sovereign immunity
depends upon proper judicial interpretation. The judiciary can severely disable the Act by arbitrarily restricting its scope. Justification for such conduct arises from neither reason nor tradition. The Weaver interpretation of
the Act was clearly not in keeping with the times. It failed to reflect either
the legislature's intentions or the current judicial trend. The Flores construction allowing suit in federal court was sound, particularly since the
State was joined by the defendant for purposes of contribution and indemnity. Piecemeal litigation in both state and federal courts was avoided.
The Flores decision also represents the current progressive trend toward removing the protective shield of sovereign immunity from those governmental functions which do not require it. Finally, the court's decision reflects the Texas Legislature's intention that the Act should be construed in
the most liberal manner consistent with the purposes behind its creation. If
the Texas Tort Claims Act's very existence rests upon proper judicial interpretation, the Flores decision represents an early prognosis of a long and
effective life.
Jeffrey C. Anderson
street to identify skid marks. In so doing, the plaintiff was hit by a passing car.
McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389, 396 (1969); see CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 820.2 (Deering 1966).

57. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 156 (W.D. Tex.
1972). Unfortunately, Flores was settled out of court on December 18, 1972, before
the trial on the merits.

58. id. The court interpreted section 13 to mean that any ambiguity should be
construed liberally in favor of the claimant, and strictly against the state.
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